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Black Panther Party v. Smith (D.C. Cir. 1981)
On December 1, 1976, the Black Panther PartyI (Party), its cofounder Huey P. Newton, and a number of its supporters filed a com2
plaint against the United States and various government officials
3
alleging an unlawful and continuing conspiracy to destroy the Party
in violation of their rights under the United States Constitution and
various statutes.4 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, as well as damages.5
1. The Black Panther Party is a black extremist group formed in late
1966 in Oakland, California by Huey P. Newton and Bobby G. Seale. For a
general review of the Party and its program, see P. FONER, THE BLACK PANTHERS SPEAK (1970). For the Party's view of its ideological mission, see generally, H. NEWTON, To DIE FOR THE PEOPLE (1972).
2. Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1247-48 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
petition for cert. filed sub noin. Moore v. Black Panther Party, 50 U.S.L.W.
3450 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1981) (No. 81-774). The defendants included FBI and CIA
Directors, Attorneys General and Secretaries of the Treasury holding office both
prior to, and after, the filing of the complaint. 661 F.2d at 1247 n.12.
3. 661 F.2d at 1246. As to the elements of the conspiracy, the plaintiffs

complained, inter alia, of unlawful mail openings, warrantless wiretaps and
break-ins, burglaries, physical harassment, and assassination of Party members

and supporters. Id. at 1248. In addition, they claimed that the government in-

cited dissension within the Party and instigated violent confrontations between
the Party and other black groups. Id.
The plaintiffs stated that they learned of the conspiracy from a Senate
Report. See SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AcTIvITIEs, Intelligence Activities and the
Rights of Americans, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Books II & III
(1976). This report revealed that the government formed a special counterintelligence program called COINTELPRO designed to neutralize target
groups, including the Party. Id. at Book III, 185-223.
4. 661 F.2d at 1248 n.14. The plaintiffs asserted that the government
violated: 1) the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures, see U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; 2) the fifth amendment guarantee of
due process, see U.S. CONsT. amend. V; 3) the ninth amendment delegation
of certain powers to the states, see U.S. CONST. amend. IX; 4) the Civil Rights
Act's prohibition on conspiracies against the rights of citizens, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1976); 5) the National Security Act's definition of the scope of CIA
powers, see 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1976); 6) the Internal Revenue Act's prohibition
on unnecessary tax examinations or investigations, see 26 U.S.C. § 7605(b)
(1976); 7) the Postal Service Act's prohibition on unreasonable discrimination
among mail users, see 39 U.S.C. § 403 (1976); and 8) the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Acts' prohibition on the interception and disclosure of wire
and oral communications, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976), and its prohibition
on unauthorized use or publication of communications, see 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1976).

Id.

5. 661 F.2d at 1247. The Party and Newton asked for a total of $100
million in compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 1249.

(198)
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As part of the discovery 6 in the case, the government served 244
7
interrogatories on the Party, and later, 82 interrogatories on Newton.
The Party responded to some interrogatories, but refused to disclose
the names of certain Party members, claiming a first amendment privilege.8 Newton answered many of the interrogatories, but based on a
claim to a fifth amendment privilege, did not reveal information
concerning pending civil or criminal matters. 9
Upon a government motion, the district court issued an order on
August 6, 1979 compelling further responses by the Party, its individual
officers and Newton.' 0 As to certain information, however, both the
Party and'Newton againasserted first and fifth amendment privileges,
respectively."' Based on these refusals, the district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' suit pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil
6. The term "discovery" generally refers to "pre-trial devices that can be
used by one party to obtain facts and information about the case from the
other party in order to assist the party's preparation for trial." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 419 (5th ed. 1979). For the rules governing discovery in the federal courts, see FEa. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
7. 661 F.2d at 1250. The parties agreed that discovery would take place
in "waves". Id. at 1249. The first wave was to be limited to requests for
documents and interrogatories, and subsequent waves would involve the taking
of depositions. Id.
8. Id. at 1250. The Party asserted that its non-public leaders and members
were protected by a first amendment privilege because disclosure of their
names would lead to harassment and the stifling of their rights of free speech
and association. Id. at 1264. The Party argued that under Rule 26(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which limits the scope of discovery to
material not privileged, the names of non-public leaders and members were
beyond the reach of proper interrogatories. For the text of Rule 26(b)(1),
see note 18 infra.
9. 661 F.2d at 1250. Newton claimed that matters relating to his tax dealings and a number of shootings were protected by a fifth amendment privilege,
because disclosure of the information would tend to incriminate him. Id.
1270 & n.157.
10. Id. at 1252. As to the Party, the district court ruled that all interrogatories as to which a first amendment privilege had been asserted were to be
answered. Id. The district court reasoned that "'[p]laintiff cannot assert
this privilege and at the same time proceed with this lawsuit, withholding
information vital to the defense of the parties sued.' " Id..(citation omitted).
The district court also held that each Party officer must individually supplement his responses to a number of allegedly inconsistent and evasive interrogatories. Id. As to Newton; the district court ruled that all interrogatories
as to which a fifth amendment privilege had been claimed were to be answered,
Id. The district court noted: "'This Court is not compelling plaintiff Newton to waive any privileges he may have, but is merely leaving the choice
to Mr. Newton, as a plaintiff, whether he wishes to continue to press
claims.' " Id. at 16 (citation omitted).
11. Id. at 1253. The Party also refused to obey that portion of the dis-

trict court order requiring individual Party officer response, arguing that Rule
33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the use of interrogatories, entitled the Party exclusively to appoint its own representative
for interrogatory purposes. Id. For the majority's and dissent's sharply differing views as to the propriety of the district court ordering individual Party
officer responses, see notes 52. & 64 infra.
12. 661 F.2d at 1253-54. Rule 37(b)(2) provides in pertinent part: "If
a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the
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Procedure for failure to comply with its order. 13 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit14 reversed
the dismissal and remanded with instructions, holding, inter alia, that
the district court should balance the threatened harm to constitutional
rights against the requesting party's need for relevant information in
deciding whether to order civil discovery of information privileged
tinder the first and fifth amendments. Black Panther Party v. Smith,
661 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed sub noma. Moore v.
Black Panther Party, 50 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1981) (No. 81-774).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) were formulated by
the United States Supreme Court in 193715 pursuant to congressional
authorization. 16 The rules contemplate a liberal discovery process in
federal litigation. 11 However, Rule 26(b)(1) expressly provides that
discovery cannot extend to matters which are privileged.18 To prevent
court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the
failure as are just . . . in addition . . . the court shall require the party

failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure." FED. R.
Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
13. 661 F.2d at 1253-54. The district court specifically justified its dismissal order by finding that: 1) the Party and Newton continued to unjustifiably maintain constitutional privileges; 2) the Party failed to clarify inconsistent and evasive answers to interrogatories; and 3) the Party disobeyed
the order requiring individual responses from Party officers. Id. at 1254. The
district court also awarded the government all costs and attorneys fees pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2). Id. For the text of Rule 37(b)(2), see note 12 supra.
14. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Wright, MacKinnon and
Ginsburg. Circuit judge Wright wrote the court's opinion. Circuit Judge
MacKinnon concurred in part and dissented in part.
15. For the original text of the rules, see Rules of Civil Procedure for
the District Courts of the United States Adopted by the Supreme Court of
the United States (Dec. 28, 1939), reprinted at 308 U.S. 645 (1939). For a
review of the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see C. WIGHT,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 62 (3d ed. 1976); I B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
0.501 [1] & [2] at 5017-28 (2d ed. 1979).
16. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1966)). This statute enabled the Supreme Court
"to prescribe by general rules the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals." Id.
17. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (deposition
discovery rules to be accorded broad and liberal treatment); Pike and Willis,
The New Federal Deposition-Discoveiy Procedure, 38 CoLuM. L. REV. 1179,
1187 (1938).
18. Rule 26(b)(1) provides in pertinent part: "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (empha-

sis added).
The rules do not define the applicable privileges, -but the generally ac-

cepted common law privileges are adopted by federal courts. See F. JAMES
& G. HAzARD, CIvIL PROCEDURE § 6.9 (2d ed. 1977). The attorney-client,
doctor-patient,

priest-penitent,

husband-wife,

and

fifth

amendment

self-

incrimination privileges are recognized by the federal courts. Id. For a general discussion of privileged discovery matter, see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
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disclosure of potentially damaging information, litigants in the discovery
process have, at times, successfully invoked constitutional privileges
0
based on the first 19 and fifth amendments.
Political organizations have asserted their first amendment rights 21
22
to block efforts aimed at obtaining the names of organization members.
For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) successfully asserted a first amendment privilege in
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.2 1 In NAACP, the United States
Supreme Court held that Alabama, in the course of seeking injunctive
relief to bar the NAACP's business activities in the state, could not
force the NAACP to reveal its membership list.24 Since the NAACP
had made a clear showing of past reprisals against its members, the
Court stated that "compelled disclosure ... [could] constitute a restraint
on freedom of association." 25
FEDERAL PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 2016-20 (1970); 27 C.J.S., Discovery,
§ 35 (1959); 23 AM. JUR. 2d, Depositions and Discovery, §§ 169-79 (1965).
19. See, e.g., Hastings v. North East Independent School Dist., 615 F.2d
628 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff's first amendment privilege sustained); Familias
Unidas v. Briscoe, 544 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff's first amendment
privilege sustained). For a review of Familias,see notes 42-46 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the first amendment privilege, see notes
21-25 and accompanying text infra.
20. See, e.g., Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination sustained); Duffy
v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1968) (litigant's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination expressly recognized). For a discussion
of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, see notes 26-30
and accompanying text infra.
21. The relevant text of the first amendment provides: "Congress shall
CoNsT.
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech ....... .U.S.
amend. I. For a general discussion of the first amendment guarantee of
free speech, see J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU'rIONAL LAW
709-847 (1978). For an articulation of the values underlying the free speech
guarantee, see Witney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
The free speech clause has been held to incorporate the freedom to
associate. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (NAACP activities were
modes of association protected by the first amendment); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (freedom to associate an inseparable
aspect of free speech). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 12-23 (1978).
22. See, e.g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) (Communist Party sought to block state
compelled disclosure of membership); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,
278 U.S. 63 (1928) (Ku Klux Klan sought to block state compelled disclosure
of membership).
23. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
24. Id. at 466.
25. Id. at 462. However, the Court has ruled that not all forced disclosures
of membership lists are violations of the first amendment; See New York ex
rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (disclosure of Ku Klux Klan
membership serves state interest in regulating unlawful groups).
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Similarly, litigants have utilized their fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination20 in claiming that requested information is privileged. 27 For example, in Spevack v. Klein,2s an attorney asserted a
privilege based upon his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination
and refused to produce certain records requested by the state at his
disciplinary hearing. 29 The United States Supreme Court sustained the
privilege claim, noting that its assertion should never be made "costly",
and insisting that the "Self-Incrimination

Clause . . . should not be

watered down." 80
Three approaches have developed to determine the validity of an
asserted constitutional privilege when it is invoked by a plaintiff against
an adversary seeking disclosure of information through the discovery
process. 3 ' First, the "automatic waiver" rule suggests that a plaintiff,
when he initiates a suit, automatically waives his constitutional privileges on pain of dismissal.3 2 The leading case adopting this position is
Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's, Inc.83

In Loew's, a private

26. The relevant text of the fifth amendment provides: "No person shall
be . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ....

"

amend. V. The privilege against self-incrimination applies when
it is "evident from the implication of the question, in the setting in which it
is asked, that a responsive answer might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
The privilege attaches in civil as well as criminal proceedings. McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). For an overview of the privilege against
self-incrimination, see generally C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 14
(1980); 21 AM. JUR. 2d, Criminal Law §§ 349-59 (1965).
27. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 620 F.2d 1086 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Adams Extract Co. v. Franey, 101 S. Ct. 897
(1981) (lower court order compelling deposition responses improper in view
of litigant's assertion of fifth amendment privilege); In re Folding Carton
Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (lower court
order compelling deposition responses improper in view of litigant's assertion
of fifth amendment privilege).
U.S. CONST.

28. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
29. Id. at 512-13.
30. Id. at 514-15.

31. When a constitutional privilege is asserted in this context, some
courts distinguish between the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant, while
others do not. Compare Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d
1084, 1089 n.10 (5th Cir. 1979) (no distinction between plaintiffs and defendants who assert constitutional privilege) with Jones v. B.C. Christopher g:
Co., 466 F. Supp. 213, 227 (D. Kan. 1979) (plaintiff, as opposed to defendant,
should not bring suit and also assert privilege).
32. See Note, Plaintiff as Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amendment, 48
U. Cm. L. REv. 158, 162 (1981). The rationale behind this rule is that the
plaintiff was responsible for filing the action, and therefore voluntarily created
the situation endangering his constitutional rights. Id. One court explained
this rationale by opining that the "[pilaintiff should not be able to 'have his
cake and eat it too.'" Jones v. B.C. Christopher 8 Co., 466 F. Supp. 213,
227 (D. Kan. 1979). See also, Note, Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52 VA. L. REv. 322, 333 (1966).
33. 22 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The automatic waiver rule of Loew's
has been widely agreed upon in the state courts. See, e.g., Galante v. Steel City
Nat'l Bank, 66 Ill. App. 3d 476, 384 N.E.2d 57 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
841 (1979); Christenson v. Christenson, 281 Minn. 507, 162 N.W.2d 194
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antitrust action, the defendant attempted to depose the corporate plaintiff's president and sole stockholder about possible Communist Party
connections.3 4 The information sought was vital to the defendant's
defense,8 5 but the corporate plaintiff's president refused to testify on
the basis of first and fifth amendment privileges.3 6 The court ruled
that the president's refusal was the corporate plaintiff's refusal, and the
corporate plaintiff waived its right to the privileges by voluntarily bringing suit, and placing itself in a position where its constitutional rights
could be harmed. 7 Although the automatic waiver rule has been
adopted by many jurisdictions, 38 it has been attacked by several courts
as a denial of due process in barring a litigant from his day in court 3 9
A second approach advocates the use of a "balancing test" to determine whether the asserted privilege should be upheld.40 This test
(1968). See also Note, Toward a Rational Treatment of Plaintiffs Who Invoke 'the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination During Discovery, 66 IOWA L.
REv. 595, 579-80 (1981).
34. 22 F.R.D. at 270.
35. The defendants attempted to defend the antitrust suit against them
by claiming that their actions were not conspiratorial but individual, and
were motivated by a good faith and reasonable belief that the plaintiff and
its president were Communists. Id. at 271-73.
36. Id. at 270-72.
37. Id. at 276, citing J. MooREu, FEDERAL RuL.S AND OFFIcIAL FORMS,
164 (1956). The Loew's court commented: "It would be uneven justice to
permit plaintiffs to invoke the powers of this court for the purpose of seeking
redress and, at the same time, to permit plaintiffs to fend off questions, the
answers to which may constitute a valid defense or materially aid the defense." Id. The court added: "[plaintiffs] cannot use this asserted privilege
as both a shield and a sword." Id. at 277.
38. A number of federal courts have adopted the automatic waiver rule.
See Sindona v. Tisch, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd mem.,
610 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980); Jones v. B.C.
Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213, 227 (D. Kan. 1979); Tomko v. Lees,
24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 407, 408 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Penn Communications Specialties, Inc. v. Hess, 65 F.R.D. 510, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Bramble v. Kleindeinst,
357 F. Supp. 1028, 1036 (D. Colo. 1973), afg'd, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974); Brown v. Ames, 346 F. Supp. 1176, 1178
(D. Minn. 1972); Lyons v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 540, 542 (9th Cir.- 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1027 (1970). See also 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.60[6],
at 252-54 (2d ed. 1979). For a sampling of state courts adopting the automatic waiver rule, see cases cited in note 33 supra.
39. See, e.g., Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958)
(due process violated when plaintiff's case dismissed for failure to obey discovery order "due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any
fault of petitioner"); Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084,
1087-88 (5th Cir. 1979) (automatic dismissal for assertion of constitutional
privilege would be unconstitutional because due process requires detennination of plaintiff's civil action); Thomas v. United States, 531 F.2d 746, 749
(5th Cir. 1976) (Constitution limits court's power to dismiss actions without
providing litigants with a hearing on the merits). See also, Note, The Emerg,ng Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARv.
L. REv. 1033, 1041-44 (1978) (noting constitutional problems with sanction
of dismissal).
40. Comment, Penalizing the Civil Litigant Who Invokes the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U.

FLA.

L.

REV.

541, 547 (1972); Comment, The

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 75,
84 (1968); see Note, supra note 33, at 594-602.
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weighs the competing interests of the plaintiff in invoking his constitutional rights, against the defendant's need for discovery. 41 The Fifth
42
Circuit explicitly adopted such a test in Familias Unidas v. Briscoe,
43
In Familias, a Mexican-American
and applied it in subsequent cases.
group asserted a first amendment associational privilege to interrogatories that were submitted by the defendant-school board which had
requested the names of the group's members.4 4 Applying an automatic
waiver theory, the lower court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 45 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit, in ruling that the dismissal was improper,
balanced the plaintiff's interest in protecting the names of its members
4
against the defendant's need for such information.
A third approach in analyzing the assertion of a constitutional
privilege against discovery grants an "absolute right" to the plaintiff
to bar the defendant's requests for information. 47 Under this approach,
41. Note, supra note 33, at 594-602. The plaintiff's interests consist of his
privilege claims under the first and fifth amendments; the defendant's interest is his need to prepare a defense. Id. at 576. One commentator has suggested that the defendant's interest may be of a constitutional order (i.e., the
defendant may have a due process right to adequately defend the suit). Id.
at 576 & n.2, citing Keller v. Hilgendorf, 79 F.R.D. 687, 689 (E.D. Wis.
1978).
Another commentator has added that the balancing test can be refined
by incorporating a "fair determination" standard into it. 1975 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 435, 443 (1975). This standard would tip the balance in favor of one
interest over the other based on whether the information withheld would
compromise the fact finder's ability to make a fair determination of the controversy. Id. See also, Note, supra note 33, at 598-600.
42. 544 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1976).
43. See Hastings v. North East Independent School Dist., 615 F.2d 628
(5th Cir. 1980); Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084 (5th
Cir. 1979).
44. 544 F.2d at 183-85. The plaintiff refused to disclose the names of
its members so as to protect their right "to associate freely in order to advance
he social and educational status of the Mexican-American." Id. at 185.
45. Id. at 186. For a discussion of the automatic waiver rule, see notes
32-39 and accompanying text supra.
46. 544 F.2d at 192. The court ruled against disclosure, stating:
To require [the plaintiffs] to forfeit that which they seek to protect
[freedom to associate] in order that they might receive federal assurance that they were indeed entitled to it initially would be an
abdication by the federal court of not only its federal stature, but
its judicial robes as well.
Id. The court relied heavily upon Supreme Court language in NAACP giving

broad protection to first amendment rights of association.

For a review of

NAACP, see notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
47. See Note, Plaintiff as Deponent, supra note 32, at 174-81 (advocating
"absolute right" approach). It does not appear that any court has adopted
the "absolute right" view. Some opinions look with disfavor upon any suggestion that the plaintiff has an absolute right to block all discovery. See
Lyons v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 540, 542 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1027 (1970) ("The scales of justice would hardly remain equal . .. if a party

can assert a claim against another and then be able to block all discovery
attempts against him by asserting a fifth amendment privilege to any interrogatories whatsoever upon his claim.") (emphasis added).
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if the plaintiffs claim of a constitutional privilege is found to be valid,
all information is protected by the privilege regardless of the defendant's need. 48

The rationale for this view is based on the nature of a

privilege in law 49 as well as the absolute language of Rule 26(b)(1)
which limits the scope of discovery to relevant non-privileged information.5 0
It was against this background that the Black Panther Party court
began its analysis. Judge Wright, writing for the court, stated that
"[t]he validity of the [dismissal] depends, in the first instance, on the
validity of the discovery orders on which [it is] based." 51 In examining
the underlying discovery orders, Judge Wright noted that the district
court failed to employ a balancing test when it compelled disclosure
of the assertedly privileged information.5 2 Since this rendered the
discovery order invalid, Judge Wright ruled that the dismissal of the
plaintiff's claim was improper. 58
The heart of the court's opinion focused on the first and fifth
amendment privileges asserted by the Party and Newton respectively.
The court rejected the automatic waiver rule of Loew's, stating that its
appeal was "superficial only." 14 The court reasoned that "plaintiffs
file suit because they believe the courts provide the best, if not the only,
48. See Note, Plainti as Deponent, supra note 32, at 174-81.

49. Id. at 176-77. A privilege exists to serve "social interest[s] extrinsic to
litigation that [are] deemed sufficiently important to require that certain
matters remain confidential, no matter how probative they may be. Disclosure
of such matters under any circumstances would tend to defeat the purpose
of the privilege." Id. at 177, citing Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74

HARv. L. REV. 940, 944 (1961) (emphasis added).
50. Note, Plaintiff as Deponent, supra note 32, at 174-77.

Rule 26(b)(1)

explicitly creates a disjunctive between relevant, discoverable matter, and
privileged non-discoverable matter. Id. at 175.

The words are absolute; once

a valid privilege is asserted, the underlying information is beyond the scope
of permissible discovery. Id. For the text of Rule 26(b)(1), see note 18
supra.
51. 661 F.2d at 1265, quoting International Union, UAW v. Right to Work

Legal Defense & Education Foundation, Inc., 590 F.2d 1139, 1152 (D.C. Cir.

1979). The majority also noted that even if the underlying discovery order
was valid, dismissal was only appropriate as a last resort "when a party has
displayed callous disregard for its discovery obligations, or when it has exhibited
extreme bad faith." 661 F.2d at 1265.

52. 661 F.2d at 1268-69 & 1273. Judge Wright also observed that the underlying discovery order was invalid because the district court lacked power to
compel individual party officers to respond. Id. at 1257. Judge Wright reasoned
that a party has broad discretion to designate the officer or agent for preparing
discovery responses under FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a). Id. In the face of this broad
discretion, Judge Wright opined that nothing in the Federal Rules enabled the
court to override an organization's choice of representative for discovery purposes. Id. at 1258. For the dissent's position on the issue of ordering individual Party officer responses, see note 64 and accompanying text infra.
53. 661 F.2d at 1280. The court also reversed the lower court's award of
costs and attorneys fees to the government. Id. at 1276. See also note 13 supra.
54. 661 F.2d at 1265. For a discussion of Loew's and the automatic waiver
rule, see notes 32-39 and accompanying text supra.
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means to protect their rights. To say they must waive those rights
when they come into court would make any judicial protection meanMoreover, the court attacked the waiver rule's rationale
ingless."5
that the plaintiffs create the situation harming their rights,56 by observ57
ing that defendants as well as plaintiffs are responsible for litigation.
The court also noted that forcing plaintiffs to choose between the waiver
of their privileges and the dismissal of their suit, as the waiver rule
commands, would "raise serious due process questions" by possibly
impinging on the plaintiff's right to his day in court. 58
Consequently, the court adopted a balancing test for determining
the validity of the plaintiff's privilege, stating that "the plaintiff's
[constitutional] claim should be measured against the defendant's need
for the information sought. If the former outweighs the latter then
the claim of privilege should be upheld." 5 The court set forth, inter
alia, the following factors to be applied in employing the balancing
test: 1) the relevance of the information sought; "0 2) the requesting
party's degree of need for the relevant information; 6' 3) the availability
of alternative information sources, 62 and 4) the feasibility of less drastic
3
remedies than dismissal."
Judge MacKinnon filed a separate opinion which dissented from
any implication that the discovery orders of the district court violated
Party officers' first or Newton's fifth amendment rights. 04 As to the
55. 661 F.2d at 1265 (footnote omitted). The court added: "Here, for
example, the Party is suing the government in part because it believes the
government' has infringed its First Amendment rights of expression and association. An automatic waiver rule would frustrate this purpose." Id. at
1265-66.
56. For a statement of the waiver rule's rationale, see note 32 supra.
57. 661 F.2d at 1265 n.142. The court explained that plaintiffs file suit
because "presumably, [they seek] to challenge some action taken by tdhe defendant." Id.
58. Id. at 1266. In connection with the possible violation of plaintiff's due
process rights, see note 39 and accompanying text supra.
59. 661 F.2d at 1266.

60. Id. at 1268. For a discussion of the balancing test approach, see notes
40-46 and accompanying text supra.
61. 661 F.2d at 1268.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1272. The court elected not to apply the balancing test itself,
but rather, remanded so as to permit the district court to apply the standard.
Id. at 1280. The court also noted that on remand, the government had the

burden of showing that their need for the requested discovery information
was substantial; even if it was substantial, dismissal of the plaintiff for noncompliance was to be used only as a last resort. Id. at 1270.
64. Id.. at 1283 & 1289 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). The dissent also disagreed with the notion that the district court

lacked power to order individual Party officer responses. Id. at 1281-82. The
dissent took the position that under FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a), which authorizes
court orders compelling discovery under appropriate circumstances, but places
no limit' on such orders, the district court had inherent supervisory power to
order individual Party officer responses. Id. at 1282. For the majority's view
on the propriety of ordering individual Party officer responses, see note 52
supra. For a full review of the disagreement between the majority and dissent
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first amendment claim, the dissent argued that the rights of Party
officers were not violated because the government's need for the information was vital, additional delay would further prejudice the government, and Party officers would be the best source for such'vital
information.65 With respect to Newton's fifth amendment claim, the
dissent reviewed the case law, and proposed that Newton did not have
"an absolute privilege for all time." 66
In balancing the interests involved, the dissent concluded that the
resulting harm to the government by further delay outweighed the
plaintiff's fifth amendment interest.67 Further, the dissent insisted that
the government had a due process right to all relevant testimony. 8
Moreover, the dissent pointed out that both Party officers and Newton
were plaintiffs who pursued allegedly illegal activities, and therefore
should not stand on the same constitutional footing as plaintiffs who
pursue purely legal activities. 69
In evaluating the Black Panther Party decision, it is initially sug7
gested that the court properly rejected the automatic waiver approach. 0
The court astutely observed that this doctrine mechanically deprives- a
plaintiff of his constitutional privileges on the theory that the plaintiff
created the situation harming his rights, when in fact the defendant,
as much as the plaintiff, is responsible for the lawsuit. 71 Further, it
on this issue, compare 661 F.2d at 1256-59 with id. at 1281-83 (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. 661 F.2d at 1284-85 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Moreover, the dissent questioned whether the district court "should
not be upheld simply on the basis that the Party failed to make a substantial
showing of privilege." Id. at 1283. The dissent insisted that the plaintiffs
actually made no showing of privilege at all but rather only claimed and alleged
possible harassment. Id. The dissent therefore distinguished the instant case
from NAACP v. Alabama where plaintiffs made an "uncontroverted showing"
of past reprisals. Id. For a review of NAACP, see notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
66. 661 F.2d at 1285-89 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
67. Id. at 1289.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1283-84. The dissent analogized the instant case with New York
ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) where the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute compelling disclosure of Ku Klux Klan membership
based on the state interest of regulating groups notorious for their acts of unlawful intimidation and violence. Id. at 1284. The dissent argued that the government, in the instant case, had a similar legitimate interest in "investigat[ing] the
[Party] to discover those violating the laws of the United States . . . and to
prevent such illegal activities in the future." Id.
70. For a discussion of the automatic waiver approach, see notes 32-39
and accompanying text supra.
71. See note 57 and accompanying text supra. The waiver rule is often
rationalized by suggesting that the plaintiff should not be able to wield his
privilege as "both a shield and a sword." See note 37 supra. It is submitted
in response that neither should the defendant be permitted to perpetrate one
injustice on the plaintiff requiring judicial redress, and subsequently perpetrate a second injustice on the plaintiff by robbing him of his constitutional
privileges by use of the waiver rule. For more criticism of the waiver rule, see
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is submitted that the court correctly commented that an automatic
waiver forces plaintiffs to choose between the waiver of their privilege
and the dismissal of their suit, and therefore, creates a serious due
process issue by possibly depriving a plaintiff of his right to a day in
court.

72

While the court may have properly rejected the waiver rule, it is
also suggested that the court's opinion was incomplete in its failure to
address the absolute right approach. 78 The court did not consider
either the nature of a privilege in law, or the absolute language of
Rule 26(b)(1), both underpinnings of the absolute right doctrine, in its
articulation of the appropriate test to determine the validity of a constitutional privilege. 74 It is submitted that this omission, in an otherwise thorough opinion, results in a de facto rejection of the absolute
right standard-a rejection without any justification set forth to support
it.75
Despite the court's failure to discuss the absolute right doctrine,
it is suggested that the court correctly adopted the balancing test for
calculating the propriety of a constitutional privilege. 76 At a minimum, the balancing test operates to ensure that all parties possess a
fair opportunity to have their claims considered in a context where
the plaintiff's interest in asserting his constitutional privilege, and the
defendant's interest in effectively defending the suit against him, are
both at stake.77 Furthermore, it is proposed that such a test guarantees
Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1089, n.10 (5th Cir.

1979); Note, Plaintiff as Deponent, supra note 32, at 163, 163-74; Note, supra

note 33, at 568-87.
72. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
73. For a discussion of the absolute right approach, see notes 47-50 and
accompanying text supra.
74. For a discussion of the two underpinnings of the absolute right approach, see notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
75. The court was apparently aware of the absolute right approach but
failed to address it. See 661 F.2d at 1265 n.142, citing Note, Plaintiff as Deponent, supra note 32 (advocating absolute right approach). The dissent did,
at least, appear to address the absolute right view. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
76. For a discussion of the balancing test, see notes 40-46 and accompany-

ing text supra.

It has been suggested that an implicit balancing of interests may be

taking place even under the two nonbalancing tests-the automatic waiver

rule and the absolute right approach. For example, under the automatic
waiver rule, the judge may elect to characterize the information sought by
the defendant as "irrelevant" and, arguing that the information is not necessary to the defendant's defense, permit the plaintiff to retain his otherwise
automatically waived privilege. Similarly, under the absolute right view, a
judge may also elect to characterize the information sought as "irrelevant" and,
arguing that the scope of privilege only extends to relevant information, permit the defendant to penetrate the plaintiff's otherwise "absolute" privilege.
Interview with Prof. John M. Hyson, Villanova Univ. School of Law, Villanova,
Pa. (August 27, 1981).
77. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
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that the trial court set forth findings in support of its decision, and
78
thereby creates a record for review by an appellate court.
Although the court selected the correct standard to apply, it is
suggested that the court failed to identify the point at which a factfinder can properly conclude that the scales of the balance tilt in favor
of one interest over the other.7 9 Without such a conceptual axis, the
balancing test can operate as an open-ended test, embracing factors
which can be given varying degrees of weight8s
As a result, the
balancing test would likely be susceptible to conscious and unconscious
manipulation by the particular judges who choose to employ it.81
Further, it is suggested that the Black Panther Party court, in
discussing the validity of plaintiff-invoked privileges, did not evaluate
the type of plaintiffs who invoke the privileges. As pointed out by the
dissent, plaintiffs who are committed to illegal acts should not be able
to assert constitutional privileges with the same ease as plaintiffs who
pursue lawful interests.82 It is asserted that constitutional rights of
individuals and groups cannot be examined in an analytical vacuum,
but, rather, should be considered against the broader background of
public security.
Lastly, it is submitted that the majority's opinion overlooked a
potentially explosive issue. The court's analysis of the plaintiff-invoked
constitutional privilege may be dangerously short-sighted in that a
countervailing constitutional right of the defendant may also be at
stake-the due process right of the defendant to adequately defend the
suit against him. 83 It is submitted that this due process right, already
recognized in this context by one federal court,84 is an important
78. The scope of appellate review is limited to errors revealed in the
record.

See Stone, The Scope of Review and Record on Appeal, 2 F.R.D.

317 (1943). It
in the record
will be stifled.
79. It has
constitute such
supra.

is suggested that where the lower court sets forth no findings
to support its decision, the appellate court's task of review

been suggested that the "fair determination" standard may
a fulcrum point. For a discussion of this standard, see note 41

80. For example, in the instant case, the fact finder could arguably conclude, as did the dissent, that the defendants' interest outweighed the plaintiffs'. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra. Conversely, the fact finder
could also conclude, as apparently did the majority, that the plaintiffs' interest may not have been outweighed. It is suggested that the majority
appeared to disagree with the implication that the plaintiffs' interest was
outweighed since they chose to remand rather than affirm the district court's
decision of dismissal. For the majority's decision to remand, see note 63
supra.

81. For an observation of the ramifications of this state of affairs, see
note 87 and accompanying text infra.
82. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
83. For a discussion of the defendant's due process right, see note 41
supra.

84. See Keller v. Hilgendorf, 79 F.R.D. 687, 689 (E.D. Wis. 1978). The dissent in the instant case also recognized this particular defendant's (i.e. the government's) right to all relevant testimony. See note 68 and accompanying text
supra.
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opposing constitutional right which may radically alter the balancing
test as applied by the court.
In reviewing the impact of the instant decision, it is suggested that
the court's balancing test will undoubtedly provide greater protection
to plaintiff's first and fifth amendment rights. However, the enhanced
protection may not be without its costs. First, adoption of the test
will probably encourage more claims of privilege 85 and create delays
in the discovery process. 86 Second, a balancing test, if adopted in more
jurisdictions, will produce disparate results varying with individual
courts.8 7

Third, a balancing test, as opposed to an automatic waiver

rule, may embolden plaintiffs with marginal claims on the merits to
bring suit hoping to wield the privilege so as to negate an adequate
defense by the defendant.8 8
It is submitted that the Black Panther Party court made a sound
effort to give guidance to the district court in future cases.8 9 But the
inherent difficulty in applying any balancing test, coupled with the
inevitable costs associated with the operation of the instant test,90
suggests that the added constitutional protection accorded the plaintiffs
may be less than wholly satisfactory.
Ganesh Bala
85. In 1979, the federal courts addressed six claims of privilege asserted
by plaintiffs as compared with only one or two per year between 1958 and
1979. See Note, supra note 33, at 583 n.78.
86. It is suggested that applying a balancing test will consume court
time and energy on every assertion of constitutional privilege by plaintiffs, and
thereby decelerate the process of discovery. For a review of discovery in
the federal courts, see notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
87. It is suggested that the court's loose balancing test consisting of pliable
factors will invite "subjective" interpretations and applications by various
judges. For an argument against such subjective judgments in the law, see
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 526-27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting);
L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
88. For example, consider the following hypothetical posited by Profes-

sor Moore. "[Pilaintiff sues on the alleged slanderous statement that defendant had called him a Communist; the defendant pleads truth as an
affirmative defense; and on the taking of plaintiff's deposition plaintiff pleads
his privilege against incrimination to a properly framed and relevant question as to plaintiff being a Communist." 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
26.60 [6], at 252-53 (2d ed. 1979). Under these facts, it is suggested that if
the plaintiff's claim of slander was marginal, he may be able to prevail on
the merits by wielding the privilege assertion so as to ensure that the defendant cannot carry his burden of proving his affirmative defense.

89. For the specifics of the court's guidelines, see notes 59-63 and accompanying text supra.
90. For a review of the possible costs associated with adoption of tile
balancing test, see notes 85-88 and accompanying text supra.
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